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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8625 
The State Engineer of the State of Utah, as the respon-
dent herein, is in complete agreement with the statement 
of the case and the statement of facts as set forth in the 
brief of appellant with respect to the issues here involved. 
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2 
However, at the risk of repetition, we feel that we must 
make a similar statement to the one contained in the brief 
we filed in the case of Goodwin v. Tracy, which case was 
also an interlocutory appeal within this same general de-
termination proceeding and which case has recently been 
decided by this Court. In that brief, we remarked that the 
respondent State Engineer had no personal or individual 
interest in the subject matter and was the respondent solely 
because of his official position; and that same statement 
is equally true here. Also, we should again state that, if 
a surface stream were under consideration here, we are 
confident that a number of other users would be allied with 
us in our defense; but the water source here is a large 
underground water basin and the other individual users 
from this basin do not appear able to realize that every di-
version from this basin has some effect upon the water 
that will be available to them now and in the future. It 
becomes necessary, therefore, that the State Engineer 
undertake the defense of a matter such as is here presented. 
The appellant, at page 16 of his brief, argues that the 
question now before the Court has become moot, except for 
those cases where the State Engineer did disallow a claim 
in this adjudication for the same reasons as in the case at 
bar ; and counsel is undoubtedly correct in this assertion. 
However, in an area as highly developed as this Milford 
underground water area, any further increase in the use 
of water should be viewed with some alarm; and the Court 
should not view this matter as entirely unconsequential. 
And it is neither fair nor proper to say that this case may 
not have other effects as no one is sufficiently a prophet 
to make such a prediction. 
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STATEMENT OF' POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT SECTION 73-1-4, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, FORMERLY SECTION 100-1-4, 
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, PRO-
VIDING THAT NON-USE OF WATER FOR A 
CONSECUTIVE FIVE YEAR PERIOD CAUSES 
A REVERSION OF THAT WATER TO THE 
PUBLIC, HAS ALWAYS BEEN EQUALLY AP-
PLICABLE TO UNDERGROUND WATER AS 
TO SURFACE WATER; AND THAT THE AC-
TION OF THE STATE ENGINEER IN DISAL-
LOWING CLAIM NO. 483, ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THERE HAD BEEN FIVE YEARS CON-
TINUOUS NON-USE DURING THE YEARS 
1930, 1931, 1932, 1933 AND 1934, WAS PROPER 
AND THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT AFFIRMING THE ACTION OF THE 
STATE ENGINEER SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT SECTION 73-1-4, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, FORMERLY SECTION 100-1-4, 
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, PRO-
VIDING THAT NON-USE OF WATER FOR A 
CONSECUTIVE FIVE YEAR PERIOD CAUSES 
A REVERSION OF THAT WATER TO THE 
PUBLIC, HAS ALWAYS BEEN EQUALLY AP-
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PLICABLE TO UNDERGROUND WATER AS ~ 
TO SURFACE WATER; AND THAT THE AC- ~~ 
TION OF THE STATE ENGINEER IN DISAL-
LOWING CLAIM NO. 483, ON THE GROUNDS :~ 
THAT THERE HAD BEEN FIVE YEARS CON- i~ 
TINUOUS NON-USE DURING THE YEARS 
1930, 1931, 1932, 1933 AND 1934, WAS PROPER ~ 
AND THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT i~ 
COURT AFFIRMING THE ACTION OF THE 
STATE ENGINEER SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
We differ with appellant's counsel not only upon the 
principle of law to be here applied but also as to the ap-
proach to the question. Appellant urges upon this Court 
and devotes a considerable portion of his brief to the prop-
osition that underground water was not considered sub-
ject to the provisions of the statutes applicable to non-use 
and also to the proposition that there was no legislative 
intent, when the 1935 underground water law was enacted, 
to apply non-use to underground water. We do not believe 
that these propositions are either material or pertinent to 
the problem before the Court as we shall hereafter demon-
strate. 
It is our position and we urge upon the Court that all 
of the waters of this state have always been subject to the 
doctrine of appropriation. W 1·athall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 
50, 40 P. 2d 755. Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 40 P. 2d 
802. As a corollary to that statement, the waters of this · ~ 
state have at all times been subject to the provision of the , , 
law that beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the 
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limit of all rights to its use. And non-use is not beneficial 
use. 
The statutes dealing with reversion to the state for 
failure to use have been a part of our water code since its 
enactment and, as a matter of fact, existed even before the 
statute that was enacted in 1903 creating the offiee of State 
Engineer. The problem before the Court is not one of leg-
islative intent nor one of what the public generally consid-
ered; but it is a question concerning one of the basic form-
ulas in our policy with respect to water and its use. And 
that policy has from the beginning been to make and secure 
the greatest possible use and benefit from every drop of 
water. 
From the beginning we have recognized that no one per-
son or group of persons could acquire or hold a right to 
~~ the use of water unless that water were being put to a 
~· beneficial use. At first we said that it would take seven 
years of failure to use before the right was lost; later, and 
as demands for the use of water became greater and more 
numerous, that period was reduced to five years. But 
~~ always there has been with us the policy that the water 
must be used and must not be permitted to run to waste. 
Water rights are treated in some instances as though 
they were in the nature of real property rights, but the 
:~ distinction between them is clearly revealed when they are 
considered in the present context. Real property, or land 
,,,. as is might better be called here, is stable and remains in 
a fixed and permanent position and, as long as the owner 
complys with the rules laid down by the state and pays 
his taxes, his ownership continues and may not be taken 
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from him. Water is fluid and it is not the same water from 
year to year and its availability for use will vary from til 
year to year and from season to season within the year; ~ 
and its fugitive nature require that it be captured and put 
to a beneficial use or it will run to waste. We again answer 
the question that there is no beneficial use where the 
water is not used. 
Following the decision by this Court in the W rat hall 
and Justesen cases, supra, wherein it was declared that all 
of the waters of this state had from the beginning been 
subject to the doctrine and the laws of appropriation, this 
Court has had a further opportunity to examine and to 
refine and to develop and to enunciate the rules that are 
applicable to underground waters, in the cases of Hanson 
v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P. 2d 255, and Fairfield 
Irrigation Company v. Carson, (Utah) 247 P. 2d 1004. We 
have carefully read and reviewed those cases and most 
emphatically say to this Court that the language therein 
clearly and concisely leads to the conclusions we are now 
urging upon the Court. 
In the Hanson case, supra, the Court discusses at length 
the question of appropriation both before and after the 
decision of this Court in WrathaU and Justesen cases and 
holds that actual diversion and use of underground water 
prior to the enactment of the 1935 ground water code was 
sufficient to establish a right, and, in connection with that 
ruling the Court said : 
"In 1935 the cases of Wrathall v. Johnson, supra, 
and Justesen v. Olsen, supra, held that the law of 
appropriation applies to the waters of subterranean 
and artesian basins." 
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In the Fairfield case, supra, this Court again consid-
ered the change in concept as to underground water and 
said: 
"Under the second proposition, we must deter-
mine the rights of the parties to the use of these well 
waters under the changed concept that they are 
public waters and subject to appropriation. Since 
the effective date of S. L. 1903, c. 100, Sec. 34, it is 
established that the right to the use of the unap-
propriated flowing streams of this state cannot be 
acquired without first filing an application therefor 
in the State Engineer's office * * * In the 
Hanson case, supra, we discussed this question at 
length and recognized an exception to the above rule 
where, as in that case, * * * 'the right to the 
use of underground waters which prior to the 
Wrathall case were not considered the subject of an 
appropriation, but which were therein held to be 
subject thereto, could be acquired prior to the 1935 
amendments * * * by merely diverting such 
waters from their natural source and placing them 
to a beneficial use. * * *' The reason for this 
exception was said to prevent hardship and injustice 
to underground water users who were misled into 
not filing such an application because no provision 
was made by the statute therefor, and neither the 
legisature, the courts, the Engineer's Office, the Bar 
nor the general public prior to 1935 intended to re-
quire such an application in artesian well cases." 
We maintain that the above statement clearly shows 
that this Court recognized that only the appropriation part 
of the statute was not applicable before 1935, and the fol-
lowing statement from this same Fairfield case affirms this 
contention : 
"The Sunshine Water Line Company acquired 
the right to the use of these well waters in 1900 by 
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drilling the wells and beneficially using the waters 
but lost that right by abandonment and also by non-
use from 1905 to 1912 under S. L. 1903, c. 100, sec. 
50, before Thomas purchased the 1.90 acres from the 
county in 1913." 
We urge upon this Court that the legislative enactment 
in 1935 of the underground water code and the exception 
there made that wells and other ground water rights would 
not be subject to the non-use statute clearly shows that the 
legislature thought that the non-use statute had and did 
apply to underground water. 
And finally it may be noted that Chapter 20, Section 
9, Laws of Utah 1880, provided: 
"A continuous neglect to keep in repair any 
means of diverting, or conveying, water, or a con-
tinuous failure to use any right to water, for a per-
iod of seven years at any time after the passage of 
this act, shall be held to be an abandonment and 
forfeiture of said right." 
That our legislature adopted a non-use statute 23 years be-
fore the office of the State Engineer was established and 
the application method of appropriation provided for clearly 
indicates that such a provision is a part of our basic con-
cepts as to water and its use. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion may we reiterate that we are not asking 
that the 1935 enactments as to underground water be ap-
plied retroactively, and that we are not seeking to determine 
legislative intent nor what the public generally considered 
to be the law. None of those things are material or rele-
vant to the issues here presented. Rather we urge upon this 
Court that, as a basic concept in our water code, failure to 
use water for the statutory period of time is a violation of 
our doctrine of appropriation and of beneficial use and 
causes a reversion of that water to the public. This has 
always been true and neither the amendments by the 1935 
legislature nor the attitude of some of the public can change 
or alter this basic truth. We earnestly commend to this 
Court that the trial court's judgment was proper and should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT B. PORTER, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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